development functions. Most states forbid savings associations to purchase and develop land, and in the few permissive states5 the investment is restricted to a small percentage of an association's total assets., If these restrictions were lifted, substantial funds could be diverted from haphazard, small-scale developments into sizeable, planned communities. Savings and loan associations, which account for nearly half the non-farm residential mortgage debt, could make a contribution as properly financed land developers.
DISECONOMIES OF SAI.ALL-SCALE AND UNDERCAPITALIZED DEVELOPMENT
The special villain of suburban housing development, the small, undercapitalized builder, usually develops small tracts that are difficult to blend into their natural settings. His site layout suffers as a result, for achieving harmony with the natural setting is a prime factor in site design. The beauty of hillside development, for example, may depend on whether roof lines echo the dominant slope of the ground, houses ascend the hill in regular steps, and streets follow the contours of the ground. Unless a single developer controls the entire vista an investment in site planning and architects' fees will be uneconomic should adjoining parcels be developed without a sense of taste, imagination, or order. 7 For then buyers will regard the entire area as just another hillside. 8 As the small or undercapitalized builder can rarely afford large parcels, he usually foregoes the expense of site planning in anticipation of unsightly development nearby.
By including mixed land uses-apartments and houses, shops and Maryland, and California account for more than half of the nation's savings associations, yet only two of these states allow land investment.
6. In a few of these states, such as Illinois, as much as ten per cent of an assodation's assets may be invested but five per cent is the usual ceiling. 7. The spillover effects of land development are well described elsewhere. See, e.g., Mandelker, Controlling Land Values in Areas of Rapid Urban Expansion, 12 U.C.L.A. L Rxv. 734 (1965); Dagen & Cody, Property, et al. v. Nuisance, et al., schools-large-scale development provides visual diversity, and satisfies a larger share of the housing market. By contrast, the small tract builder, hoping to sell quickly and avoid the cost of a careful market analysis, builds only for the largest sector of the housing marketyoung married couples with middle or higher incomes and two or three children. 10 Unlike the large developers he runs no risk of saturating a sector of market; and in any case the size of his parcel precludes much variety in his houses or his clientele.
The developers of new towns and planned communities profit by forestalling strip commercial development in favor of graceful shopping plazas and malls; they know that pleasant shopping facilities augment the sale of housing in their projects. Shopping center developers who are unconcerned with adjacent housing, tend to disregard their impact on neighboring land.
The developer of a large project ordinarily dedicates more land for 9. A series of public hearings conducted by the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission revealed that the most important planning goal to persons attending the hearings was the provision of a wide variety of housing types within communities. Moreover, seventy-five percent of the persons attending desired the encouragement of a wide variety of commercial, cultural, and civic facilities in suburbia. NORTHEASTERN 22, 24 (Duggar ed. 1961) . A typical large-scale project would include such types of housing as single-family detached homes, semi-attached row houses, high-rise cooperative apartments, and retirement housing.
10. In 1964, the average (mean) household size in husband and wife families where the head was under 45 years of age was 4.4. Of the nearly 21 million such families, some 20 million were urban and rural non-farm residents; only 2.8 million had no children. U.S. BUREAU schools and recreation than even the most aggressive local governments require through subdivision regulations. 1 1 As he knows, homebuyers avoid tracts where their children must cross busy streets on the way to school. Community swimming pools and golf courses pay their own way in increased sales. But in small tracts there is usually no room to insert school and park sites, and insufficient housing units to write off their cost. As a result the entire community, instead of the development, bears the costs of its school and park facilities.
12
There is no entirely satisfactory way of making the small, unplanned development pay for the expenses imposed on its neighbors. Some local governments have tried to ban all new development or, through minimum lot size zoning, to control population density. But the courts have been unsympathetic to these control measures" and home builders 
1119, 1119-22 (1964).
There may be situations in which the burden of financing public facilities should fall upon existing residents of communities, despite the fact that newcomers create the need for additional facilities. Subdivision fees, like exclusionary zoning, can bar low income groups from suburbs. Why should suburbs be able to cast Eie burden of supplying public facilities for the less-well-off exclusively on the central cities in this way? When low density zoning forces a developer to concentrate on supplying high income housing markets against his better judgment about prevailing market trends, perhaps stringent limits on subdivision exactions-which are imposed in addition to the high per-unit land cost created by exclusionary zoning--are justifiable. This question was latent in Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Town of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, 172 A.2d 40 (1961) , affd without opinion, 78 N.J. Super. 471, 189 A.2d 22.6 (App. Div. 1963) . The developer, who owned 19A miles of the 42 square mile tomship, contracted to donate schoolrooms and land for fire and police stations in return for zoning which would allow 75 X 100 lots, and some garden apartments, industry . and commercial uses. A later council revoked the contract, and the revocation was sustained. The court's opinion contained dicta that public service facilities could not be derived from subdividers but had to be financed out of public funds. Heyman and Gilhool expend considerable energy attacking this dicta. The facts of the Midtown Properties case, though. suggest that large-scale developers can afford to dedicate land and to pay for public service facilities, but only if they can build for the heaviest markets, freed from the binds of local zoning ordinances. The case also implies that, depending on the strengths of respective housing markets, there are occasions when a large tract built for moderate income families is better able to absorb the costs of public facilities than one constructed for high income groups. This is confirmed by a recent study of New York suburbs by the Pratt Institute School of Architecture which concluded that the ability of moderate income developments to support public facilities is generally greater than that of high income developments, N.Y. 
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have powerful allies in the local landowners who hope to sell off their holdings. Communities resigned to rapid growth, and aware that they cannot force small-tract developers to dedicate lands for schools and parks, have imposed subdivision fees varying with the number of lots in a project. Increasingly, courts are willing to uphold such exactions only when the local government can prove that the additional community facilities for which the fees are assessed are uniquely attributable to the developer's project. 14 Even in states where the courts allow the most liberal evidentiary standard for proving that a particular project has generated the need for a certain park or school, local governments rarely force small-tract developments to pay their own way in social services. 15 Most of these expenses a large-tract builder bears without question.
Of course, the size of a project is no assurance of quality; huge developments may be poorly planned and niggardly in yielding space for public uses. But the guilty large builders usually share the characteristic small builder's plight of undercapitalization. Such a developer borrows heavily, at high interest rates-usually one per cent or more a month.' 6 His pressing loan repayment schedule is likely to prevent him from allotting planners and architects enough time to conceive and prepare careful plans, from experimenting with novel construction techniques, or from arranging land uses in unusual layouts for untested markets 11
Mich. 622, 132 N.W.2d 687 (1965) (divided court upholding a graduated lot-size ordinance which imposed acreage minimums ranging from 7200 to 20,000 square feet).
14. 21. Among the most ambitious proposals was S. 1354 to provide federal aid for the purchase of remote tracts by state land development agencies which were then to lay out entire new cities, and sell the land to private developers subject to planning and use controls. 
25.
The planning fraternity is not committed to the theory that the public sector ought to dictate spatial arrangements. While many concur with Charles Haar that "The aim of planning may be to eliminate the inefficiencies of the market mechanism," few are prepared to attempt to alter the basic structure of housebuilding. Haar, The Social Control of Urban Space, in CrMs AND SPACE 175, 200 (Wingo ed. 1963). Professor Dunham has rather aptly expressed the position for restraining the scope of planners' authority:
A refusal to approve a subdivision because the planners prefer a "Radburn" type of lay-out to that proposed by the private developer would be comparable to an order of the Federal Trade Commission preventing automobile companies from marketing a car with a two-tone color scheme because it believed the public would so quickly tire of the style that there would be accelerated obsolescence. In street planning terms, the plan commission ought to concern itself with design and lay-out of the subdivision only where the development as proposed will adversely affect neighboring properties. Dunham, City Planning: An Analysis of the Content of the Master Plan, 1 J. LAW 9& ECON. 170, 185-86 (1958) . Even when planners seek affirmatively to shape the urban environment, the demands of time and the pragmatics of development force them to concentrate their limited resources in the large projects.
26. As the court in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, supra note 15, at 622, 187 N.W.2d at 449-50, explained:
Where a comparatively small tract of land is subdivided,.., and there Is no adjoining land already devoted to school, park, or playground purposes to which a portion of the proposed subdivision might be attached, it usually would be impracticable to require dedication of any land of the subdivision. The two alternatives are either to relieve the subdivider from any obligation whatever in this direction, or to require payment of an equalization fee ....
27
. "As much as we malign the FHA they make even architects observe some standards which the architects otherwise might not have observed.... I think they've done a great deal to improve the standards for say the tract house. [Vol. 75:1271 developers with planning advice. 2 8 Until recently, however, mortgage insurance was available only in completed projects to homebuyers. To acquire land and plan the site the developer had to use funds which he did not recapture from FHA mortgage proceeds and down payments until after his houses were sold. Therefore, even with an FHA commitment to insure home mortgages, the undercapitalized builder needed to minimize site planning and land costs. In 1965 Congress extended insurance coverage to mortgages for land acquisition and site planning costs. 29 The impact of this legislation will be limited, however, by the amount of insurance the FHA is willing to issue under the new program 0 and its interest and discount rate ceilings. 31 The maximum FHA rate is customarily lower than the going rate charged by savings associations, 3 2 where small builders usually have to go for their front money. Of all mortgages written on new homes in the United States in 1964, only 22% were FHA insured; 3 3 and relatively few of these were obtained by small builders, 34 43. Savings associations mortgages tend to be on more modest properties, have higher loan to value ratios, and cost more in interest and fees. In 1964 savings associations took legal or distress actions against 0.53% of their borrowers as compared with 0.A6% for all builders unable to obtain funds from commercial banks or insurance companies. 44 Ordinarily, they encounter an established developer only when he wants to retrieve the capital he has invested in a project. The larger developer who is a good credit risk generally obtains funding from banks and insurance companies even for his unconventional ventures. When he borrows from a savings association, he is usually seeking to recapture the capital he has invested in a completed project from mortgage proceeds-hardly the situation in which he considers the potential long term yield which sound planning might generate.
Since savings associations finance high risk ventures in exchange for high interest rates, they might also be expected to finance novel land developments as they sometimes do for small developers . These figures probably do not reflect the national average, as California contract interest rates have been 2 to 2 points higher than in large eastern cities. Charges for commissions, premiums, and fees far exceed the national average. GovaRNOR's ADvlsORY Co1M'"N ON HOUSING PROBLEMS, op. cit. supra note 36, at 21. California statistics are particularly important; savings and loan assets in California are the largest in the nation-over $23 billion. Illinois follows with $10,517,000,000, Ohio with $9,144,000,000 and New York with $7,370,000,000. 1965 FACT BOOK 81.
44. See note 2 supra.
45. An example is the Oakland developer of low-rise speculative apartment houses who decided to install light weight metal fireplaces. Commercial banks and insurance companies, uncertain of the market for such an amenity, denied him financing. He was compelled to pay the higher savings association rate for his first projects. The fireplaces were well received and the developer now obtains his loans from banks and insurance companies. The large developer who is a good credit risk ordinarily obtains funding from banks and insurance companies even for his unconventional ventures. When he borrows from a savings association, it is usually because he seeks liquidity, and liquidity is generally incompatible with experimental land development. The heavier the debt service costs, the less likely is a developer to experiment with new housing forms and to make long-term real estate investments. The Oakland apartment house developer is an exception; the builder who cannot obtain a favorable loan for his inventive enterprises usually modifies his plans to suit the conservative lender. Risse, The Influence of Institutional Lenders [Vol. 75:1271 usually the risk is provided, not by a novel construction technique, but by the builder's low credit rating, the uncertainty of the housing market or a high loan-to-value ratio. Once a builder obtains a loan from a savings association, he faces heavy debt service costs which require a fast return on his investment. This is a further deterrent to experimentation.
Only infrequently do savings associations lend money for urban renewal projects 46 and new towns or large planned communities.
7
Such investments have traditionally required larger outlays than small associations can afford if they are to maintain portfolio diversity. This barrier is of decreasing importance because associations have been growing rapidly. Between 1954 and 1964, while the number of associations increased only slightly, their assets grew from $20,000-000,000 to $120,000,000,000.
8
The second reason that savings associations have not participated heavily in prime large-scale development is that mortgage yields are higher on speculative, conventional housing. 4 0 But direct investors in predeveloped land, owners of commercial property such as shopping centers, and developers of large-scale planned communities have real- 49. Large sums in a single venture effect considerable savings for both lender and borrower. The conventional insurance company investor currently wants a 6-y% yield. Depending on the credit standing of the borrower, this can and often does result in rates as low as 6-V% on both construction and long term mortgages. Interview With Richard Chew, Manager of Mortgage Loan Department, Coldwell Banker & Co., Los Angeles, Calif., Aug. 4, 1966. This is considerably lower than the average going savings and loan rate.
ized greater returns than savings associations.5° If allowed to invest directly in land developments, savings associations would be likely to shift some of their funds from mortgages to reap these gains.
LENDING RESTRICTIONS
The public regulations which govern savings associations impose the concerns of the past on an industry 1 whose finance needs and practices have changed radically. Savings associations were started during the industrial revolution as mutual aid societies by workmen who pooled their savings to provide one another with funds for building a home. 52 These mutual aid origins account for peculiar rules that in some states give depositors the title of "stockholders"-althougli the association is in fact controlled by the owners of its publicly traded shares. 53 New savers in federally chartered associations are surprised to learn that they are owners when they receive their first proxy form. Actually, control of federal associations is divided between management and federal regulators. 54 This nominal mutuality has remained a part of the industry's public image and makes the proposal that associations become land developers seem radical indeed. But in practice savings associations are already professional lending companies, bear- ing scarce resemblance to groups of workmen in a pub sharing half crowns and ale.
In the past decade, land in the United
Associations are required to place most of their assets in mortgages on single-family dwellings. This made sense in the 1930's when singlefamily homes, constructed by small builders, were the dominant pattern. At the time the average home builder was constructing fewer than four houses a year on single parcels or lots in small, unplanned subdivisions.55 Large-scale developments, on the other hand, were a hangover from the disastrous real estate boom. In the early years of the century there had been along mass transit routes scattered large-scale subdivisions which had been poorly designed; and in the 1920's and 1930's many had failed, leaving suburban communities with unredeemable expenditures for abandoned streets and utilities. 0 It seemed only good sense for Congress to ignore the financing needs of the large development. Today, however, the big developer is responsible for most of what is imaginative and well-planned in residential housing, and the laws that divert savings association funds away from large developments make poor public policy.
Congress also worked on the assumption that no one but the association would advance home loans. Thirty years ago short term mortgages based on a 50% loan-to-value ratio seemed daring and ample, and commercial banks and other institutional lenders treated them as unsound high-risk investments. 7 With increased job security for middle income wage earners, FHA mortgage insurance, and the Federal National Mortgage Association's (FNMA) secondary market operations, home loans have become acceptable risks for even the most conservative lenders. Today, commercial banks are making home and construction loans on terms that would have astounded the New Deal architects of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).r s 55. According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics study of 1938, the average builder of single family dwellings constructed only 3.5 houses a year. Only about one-fourth of the builders produced as many as the average. Of the twenty-eight cities in the BLS Survey with populations of 100,000 or more, thirteen did not have a builder who constructed twenty-five houses a year. CoLEAN, AMEFuIcAN HousING, PRO3LEMS AND PRospEtrs 75 (1944 (Supp. I, 1965) . Amendments to the Banking Act enacted in 1935 as part of the effort to increase funds for mortgagelending permitted national banks to make 10 year loans up to 60% of value, provided
1966]
Preempted in this market by other institutions and prevented by law from making substantial direct investments, the savings associations have had to make mortgage loans which approach the full value of the property. In the volatile real estate market savings associations are making home mortgage loans at 90% of value for 30 years, without the benefit of FHA mortgage insurance, and even in states where mortgage foreclosure costs may equal 10% of the value of the security. 0 Developers large and small turn to savings associations when they seek to "cash out," i.e., to obtain a loan appraisal based on the fair market value of the completed project which exceeds actual costs, thus returning to the project sponsor his invested capital. 0 Even with a 70% loan-to-value ratio, the savings association may have the only capital at risk in a speculative apartment house or tract. 01 If the land values rise, the worth of the developer's equity increases, and he pays off the mortgage debt. When values decline, he defaults. In many states with substantial savings association activity, anti-deficiency judgment statutes bar mortgagees from recovering against debtors personally should the property bring a price at foreclosure inadequate to satisfy the debt.
62 Thus while savings associations may suffer heavily in bad times, they profit only modestly from land inflation, despite the risks they take.
State and federal associations are allowed to make limited investments in real estate under a variety of laws. They are usually perthat at least 40% of the loan was amortized during the term. Banking Act of 195, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 706-07 (1935 
61.
To say that savings associations are taking the risks which we ordinarily assign as "equity" risk is not to imply that apartment house or tract developers are receiving undeserved gains. As Wallace F. Smith contends:
It has been customary to disguise the earnings of the real estate entrepreneur as a return on equity investment. If high loan ratios seem to indicate that mortgage lenders are providing equity capital as well, they do not mean that lenders are performing entrepreneurial functions. Our argument has been that the input of entrepreneurship is a separate component of value and a necessary ingredient in a healthy real estate economy. Id. at 95. This is a compensable input and "it is the ultimate value of the package of resources, not their initial costs, which should govern long-term lending or investing decisions. mitted to own the office buildings which they occupy, even if substantial space is leased to others. 63 From state to state such acquisitions may not exceed fixed percentages of, variously, reserves, assets, surplus accounts, or paid-in savings liability. Everywhere associations are authorized to acquire, manage and develop foreclosed property for resale. 64 But only thirteen states allow associations to purchase and develop land, 6 5 and this investment prerogative is denied altogether to federally chartered institutions. 06 Even in the thirteen permissive states land investment is limited to paltry percentages of an association's total assets.
67
While federal associations lack the authority to invest in suburban land, they may place up to two per cent of their assets "in interests in real property located within urban renewal areas."0s But urban renewal equities have little attraction for federal associations. With enormous capital outlays the success of an urban renewal construction job depends on what happens to the buildings around it. Federal and state urban renewal procedures are time consuming, intricate, and often infuriating to the sponsor. Savings association management is unfamiliar with real estate values in typical renewal areas, and it is yet to be demonstrated that equity holdings in urban renewal projects are profitable. 6 9 With the exception of urban renewal, savings associations have invested in real estate whenever possible. 
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Construed liberally, existing law governing federal associations provides a limited means for association sponsorship of land development. An association's assets may be invested "in the capital stock, obligations or other securities of any corporation organized under the laws of the State ... in which the home office of the association is located, if the entire capital stock of such corporation is available for purchase only by savings and loan associations of that State .. . but no association may make any investment under this sentence if its aggregate outstanding investment . . . would thereupon exceed 1 per centum of its assets." 71 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) has sought to limit the functions of such corporations:
Substantially all of the activities of such service corporation (shall) consist of originating, purchasing, selling and servicing loans upon real estate and participating interests therein, and/or clerical, bookkeeping, accounting, statistical, or similar functions performed primarily for savings and loan associations, plus such other activities as the Board may approve. The Board's regulations could be challenged as an unauthorized effort to restrict a right granted to associations by Congress. 7 3 Or the Board's interpretation of its regulations might be protested on the grounds that the regulations are sufficiently broad to sanction land development activity.
7 4 But a change in the regulations would be more expedient. 73. Since land development would ordinarily result in the creation of single family houses financed by savings association mortgages, an association's entrepreneurial efforts could be regarded as an elaborate means of "originating loans," a permissible purpose for service corporations under the Board's present regulations.
74. Sentiment among many savings and loan men reflects this point of view. It is not wholly unwarranted. When Representative Addonizio of New Jersey introduced H.R. 8647 in 1961, its purpose was to provide for a situation particular to New Jersey, although the bill was worded to apply to all savings and loan associations.
The Central Corporation of Savings and Loan Associations, a corporation wholly-owned by the State chartered savings and loan associations of New Jersey, had broad powers ancillary to the primary activities of the savings and loan business and operated as a very useful adjunct to the affairs of the co-owning institutions. For example, It could warehouse mortgages for them. Federal savings and loan associations activated in New Jersey could not participate in this cooperative organization as they were not empowered to invest their assets in capital stock. Letter From Hon. Wright Patman, August 2, 1966. As finally enacted, the bill disappointingly provided only the means of implementing cooperative data processing primarily for smaller associations. It has not been used 1292 [Vol. 75:1271 Better still would be the enactment of an enabling law such as California Financial Code § 6705, a typical state statute authorizing association land development:
An association may invest in real property and such investment may include subdividing and developing real property and building homes and other buildings on such property principally for residential use by veterans, housing for the elderly, or urban renewal or improvement. An association may own, rent, lease, manage, operate for income, or sell such property. Investments of an association under this section... shall not at any one time aggregate more than whichever of the following is the lesser:
(a) Five percent of its total assets. (b) An amount equal to the sum of its capital, surplus, undivided profits, loan reserve, federal insurance reserve, and such other reserves as the commissioner may prescribe. 75 
TiHE RISKS OF SAViNGS ASSOCIATION'S BECOIING LAND DEVELOPERS
A statute of this type, if adopted widely, would free savings and loan associations to become an important factor in the land development business. AS a result there would probably be some improvement in the quality of new construction-at least to the extent that poor housing is attributable to the abundance of undercapitalized sponsors. For even with a five per cent limitation, association-developers would be spared the high financing costs and burdensome repayment schedules that drive many small developers to seek a quick and safe return in shoddy construction.
But savings associations are in business to make money, not to please architects. An association developer would be likely to contruct a new town only if returns on such a well-planned, large-scale development promised to exceed yields on poorly planned tracts, shopping centers or apartment houses. The California statute leaves this choice entirely to the developer's discretion. If an association found it more profitable to build housing without amenities, the statute would offer no reasons for the developer to provide them anyway.
Of course, the associations' powers could be confined to encourage the financing of high quality building. Larger, well-financed land development is ordinarily the best; therefore, lending authority might be limited to projects which exceed minimum acreages, densities, or costs. Exceptions might be necessary to permit the participation of extensively. Nevertheless, the FHLBB limitations would seem in accord with Congressional intent. See S. REP. No. 1265 , 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1964 .
75. CAT_ FIN. CODE § 6705 (Supp. 1966).
small associations and to avoid prejudicing the associations against investment in urban cores and experimental projects of modest size. As an alternative, investment authority could be framed in qualitative terms, permitting only well-designed projects with diverse land uses and adequate open space for recreation and schools. If present supervisory agencies had to determine whether proposed investments satisfy the standard, financial supervisors, short on experience in planning, would be charged with functions beyond their competence. The task could be delegated to professional planners and architects. Planning experts disagree, however, on the precise form which the city should take to realize the benefits of both urban diversity and rural amenity. Disciples of Frank Lloyd Wright, committed to open spaces and increased mobility, dispute the urbanisme of LeCorbusier's followers; and both groups are opposed by planners in the Garden City and English New Town tradition as well as by such enthusiasts of the traditional city as Jane Jacobs. Each of these positions contains splinter parties, purists and revisionists in endless variety. In sum, while the prologue, "freer access to natural amenities," 70 appeals to everyone, there is no consensus on how to go about improving the urban form.7 7 Because of these divisions, it probably makes sense to experiment with different types of urban arrangements and to provide housing consumers with the widest range of choices The risk that experimentation might be impaired by a rigid, doctrinaire administration must be weighed against the prospect of undistinguished outputs if association investment is to be guided solely by consumer preferences. Should the question of planning controls stymie efforts to enact an enabling law, corporations restricted to one per cent of an association's assets and closely supervised by the FHLBB, could become land developing subsidiaries, empowered to conduct pilot projects. This would give the Board an opportunity to test numerous patterns of planning controls.
In markets with no backlog of demand for housing, savings associa- tion competition might dislodge existing well-financed builders and developers. Membership in the FSLIC and FHLB programs provides associations with cheaper capital than land development companies can procure 79 and associations are taxed at lower than corporate rates because of a favorable deduction for bad debt reserves. 8 0 These advantages might permit savings associations to displace more efficient land developers.
But the supposed tax inequality between associations and land developers is an illusion. Associations' gains from land development are taxed at regular corporate rates; on that portion of their portfolio which is invested directly in real estate, their bad debts reserves are calculated in the same way as those of ordinary land development concerns.
79.
The FHLB operates through twelve banks. They serve as central credit banks for member institutions and have no contact with the public other than through the sale of consolidated obligations. The maximum borrowing limit of any member is set at an amount not exceeding 507 of its total savings balances. Within this tolerance, a line of credit is established for each member institution. Interest rates to members vary with the length of the loan period and the state of the capital market. In 1964, they were as high as 4.5% and as low as 3.227 at various regional banks. See FHLBB, 1964 A,,ULAL R'oRT 104-05 (1965) .
The FSLIC insures savings accounts of savings and loan associations up to $10,000. In carrying out its function, the FSLIC may take over the assets of a defaulting institution, take over loans of a defaulting institution, or make direct loans to help rehabilitate. Insured institutions pay a regular annual premium of 1/12 of 1% of the total of all savings and creditor obligations outstanding and certain reserve prepayments. See FHLBB supra, at 30-42. While direct loans are infrequent, the fact of insurance increases depositor confidence and lowers the rate of dividends required to attract savings. See generally, 1965 FACT BooK 109-25.
80. Savings associations may compute the bad debt deduction from taxable income by adding an amount determined to be a reasonable addition to the reserve for losses on nonqualifying loans (INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 593(b) (1)(A)), plus the reserve for qualified real property loans (defined in INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 593 (e)(1) as "any loan secured by an interest in real property which is to be improved out of the proceeds of the loan') which may be determined under one of the following three methods: (1) An amount determined by experience to be a reasonable reserve for losses; (2) an amount equal to the amount necessary to increase the reserve for losses to 3 per cent of qualifying real property loan outstanding at the dose of the taxable year, (3) an amount equal to 60 per cent of the taxable income for such year less the amount deducted for nonqualif)ing loans provided the difference does not exceed the amount necessary to increase the balance of reserve for losses for qualifying real property loans to 6 per cent of such loans outstand. ing at the close of the taxable year. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 593(b)(2)-(4). However, the deduction is limited to the greater of the amount under method 1 or the amount of total bad debt deduction for qualifying and non-qualifying loans which equals the amount by which 12 per cent of total deposits at the dose of the year exceeds the sum of surplus, undivided profits, and reserves at the beginning of the year. INr. REv. CODE or 1954, § 593(b) (1) The associations derive their real competitive advantage from the FSLIC and FHLB programs. Conceivably, associations could be authorized to create land development companies funded entirely by uninsured public subscription. But unless funds were diverted from savings accounts, these corporations would have no appreciable effect on the availability of loans for undercapitalized building. Association management might convince potential savers to invest in development companies instead. If these companies failed, however, confidence in the industry would decline, thus creating some of the consequences the FSLIC was designed to prevent. Perhaps the best way to limit unfair competition is to follow the practice of some states and authorize a public administrator to withhold approval of any project which creates an excessive danger to existing development. 8 '
Various calamities which might result from land development by savings associations can be imagined, but none of them seems very likely. Land prices might rise as savings associations bid for suburban and exurban land suitable for a subdivision. A priori, it is just as likely that the entry of association developers will decrease land prices. Present prices are inflated by vendors who must take back mortgages or trust deeds for most of the purchase price. The magnitude of inflation is reflected in the appraisal practices of the Los Angeles County Tax Assessor; he assumes that for every dollar which the vendor finances, one dollar is added to the purchase price.
8 2 Vendor financing is unnecessary when savings associations purchase.
Another fear is that association insiders will take illicit profits by selling their own land to the company at excessive prices. But management's existing power to issue mortgages based on their own appraisals offers as much opportunity for fraudulent self-dealing as the power to purchase real estate. In either case, the association can be protected by supervisory agents who make periodic reappraisals. 83 81. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 792.7. 82. The Rule is not inflexible. For sound first mortgages with 30% down, the discount may be as low as 25%; for second mortgages or subordinated purchase money mortgages with smaller equities, the discount may run as high as 80%. Interview With Carl Lusk, appraisal office of the Los Angeles County Tax Assessor, Aug. 18, 1966.
83. The California Division of Savings and Loan currently engages in such a practicespot-checking approximately 5% of loans with reappraisals. A quantitative measure of the divergence between the Division's policy and the associations' policy may appear through such reappraisals, and may lead to a full evaluation of other potential divcrgencies. In one recent case, 15% of an association's net worth was frozen into reserves on the basis of an audit of six months' lending. This, needless to say, is a potent deterrent. Interview With J. Walter Lautenberger, Jr., Senior Research Analyst, Calif. Div. of Savings and Loan, Los Angeles, Calif., July 8, 1966.
If equity investment proves successful small builders who depend on savings associations for financing might lose their primary source of funds. To the extent that small builders act as developers, acquiring land and planning sites, they should be displaced by larger investors. Using vendor financing they pay more for land. Unlike large builders, they purchase sites at premiums within a year of development instead of three to five years earlier. 84 They tend to buy smaller tracts, 8 5 to the chagrin of rural vendors who prefer to sell entire tracts or farms; and, as noted at the outset, they plan sites improperly. But the activities of small builders as developers must be distinguished from their conduct as house builders. Marginal developers, who crowd houses together on small parcels and even then lose money on land acquisition, earn their profits by constructing houses. 3 0 These builders could continue their construction activities within the context of large, planned communities. The prevailing practices of huge land devel- opers are illustrated by the Irvine Company now developing 88,000 acres in Orange County, California, and Home Savings and Loan Association of California (assets over two billion dollars) with more than $44 million in real estate other than association premises. 87 These developers sell parcels in subdivisions marked for expensive housing to small builders, many of whom are the master craftsmen of the construction industry, specializing in custom houses. 88 If large builders relied more on prefabrication or industrialized parts, they might be so much more efficient than small builders as to displace them even in luxury markets. 8 9 But housebuilders large and small tend to employ similar production techniques, and the concern which builds 100 houses per year is nearly as efficient as the largest firms. 0°S ome people fear that builders in a savings association project will be forced to obtain construction and "take out" financing exclusively from the land developing association. But state and federal anti-trust laws are available to police such arrangements. 9 1
Another anxiety is that associations instead of charging excessive loan fees will lose vast sums if permitted to invest in undeveloped land. The limited available data suggest that undeveloped land does not deserve its notoriety as a risky investment. In the last decade land investment has yielded an 18% return with fewer foreclosures than See also Hearings on S1354, supra note 21, at 397 ("By and large, in our industry, the small builders will buy from a land developer who is not a whole lot bigger, economically, than he is.").
89. The present prefabrication package may vary from 25 per cent to 90 per cent of the material comprising the house. Prefabricated housing accounts for less than one-tenth of all residential building, and the largest prefabricator in the United States produced only 30,000 dwellings in 1960. MEYERSON 90. When the homebuilder reaches the 500-800 units per year output level, he experiences no further significant economies. MABSEL, Op. cit. supra note 19, at 221. On the other hand, most builders of over 100 units a year manage to some extent to accumulate sufficient reserves to inaugurate new and larger projects, ride out the fluctuations of the building cycles, fund their own land acquisition and development, and generally establish a forceful bargaining position vis-a-vis lenders, contractors, and suppliers. 1-EzoC, op. cit. supra note 2, at 22-27. 91. Indeed, the whole parade of antitrust horribles-tying, exclusive dealing, market division, monopolization-are all possible under this scheme, but there is no reason to believe that their occurrence will be any more probable here than in the myriad of other savings and loan operations.
conventional home mortgages. -Were savings associations to become land developers, it would be appropriate to monitor their activity for its effects on land prices, large and small house builders, the quality of suburban land development, conflicts of interests, and anti-trust violations. But the chance of gains through better-financed land development outweighs the risks involved in experimenting.
Our conclusions are necessarily tentative due to a lack of supporting data on many crucial points. We do not know enough about the practices of savings associations to do more than surmise how management would react to increased investment powers; we are unable to predict their reactions with confidence. And, further, we can only guess at the ways in which institutional lenders do or could alter the processes of land development. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has obtained $500,000 to study the savings association industry with a view to improving its financial soundness. But we also need to design a system for depicting the complex relationships between the private land lenders and land planning. Perhaps there would be greater interest in such an endeavor if the Federal Home Loan Bank Board had remained within that network of agencies now incorporated in the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Short of a merger of finance and planning agencies, connections may be drawn between land finance institutions and planning goals through the exploration of specific hypotheses for law reform, such as we have sought to initiate here.
92. Interview With Russell C. Chase, supra note 46. A study in Southern California conducted by an independent agency on behalf of Property Research, Inc. revealed that, proportionately, the ratio of raw land mortgage defaults to conventional mortgage defaults may be as high as 1 to 50. FHA mortgages on housing in the study area, for example, experienced a default rate of 1.9%. In two counties within the area, Riverside and Ventura, on parcels of land of forty acres or more, default rates were .028% and .015%, respectively. Interview With Kent Williams, supra note 50. Long term mortgages, on the other hand, are eminently safer than construction mortgages. Interview With J. Walter Lautenberger, supra note 83.
